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THE CLASH OF 20TH CENTURY REGULATION
WITH 21 s CENTURY TECHNOLOGY
MARK PRUNER*
LAWYERS AT A CROSSROAD
The Internet is over 25 years old, but for lawyers, the impact of
the Internet is only now having a major impact on the practice of
law. The Internet became usable by the average attorney only
after the creation of the easy-to-navigate World Wide Web by
Tim Berners-Lee at CERN in Switzerland and the subsequent
creation of the first web browser, Mosaic, by Marc Andreessen at
the National Center for Supercomputing Applications on the
University of Illinois Champaign/Urbana campus. Mosaic was
conceived in December 1992 and the code was written in the first
quarter of 1993. The World Wide Web, as most people know it, is
therefore only nine years old.
Since the creation of the World Wide Web, no communications
medium has ever experienced such rapid growth and change as
has the Internet. The rapid growth of the World Wide Web,
email, intranets, instant messaging and other Internet technolo-
gies is changing the way law firms operate and the way they
market themselves.' In June 1995, two years after Mosaic was
created, the number of law firm websites was so small that they
all could be visited in one hour of surfing the Internet. Since
. Mark Pruner founded and is President of Web Counsel, LLC, which provides marketing services and
creates Internet based marketing programs for the legal community. Mr. Pruner is Of Counsel to law
firms on matters related to Internet law and advises website design firms on legal issues.
I See Todd H. Flaming, Survey of Illinois Law: Recent Developments in Legal Tech-
nology, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 915, 927-28 (2000) (explaining that use of computers and Inter-
net enables lawyers to communicate with clients, do research and speak with opposing
counsel); see also L. Leon Geyer, The Agricultural Lawyers' Guide to the Internet 3
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 63, 64-66 (1998) (noting large percentage of lawyers surveyed an-
swered that they used Internet to communicate with clients, colleagues and to market
legal services); Michael Rustad, Legal Resources For Lawyers Lost in Cyberspace, 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 317, 349 n.282 (1996) (stating growth of World Wide Web led to law-
yers creating websites).
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then nearly every medium and large law firm have established a
website and the Internet has started to reshape the practice of
law. The last nine years has also seen the rapid expansion of law
firm marketing departments.
As a result lawyers now stand at a cross-roads. Law as tradi-
tionally practiced is a static set of services in a rapidly expanding
set of professional service options. Until recently firms have been
complacent as a growing economy had raised all boats, but other
professions grew much faster. To see what kind of growth, tech-
nology can create, you need only look at the Big 4 consulting
firms and other large professional services firms, which have
been growing at compounded rates of 25% and what is even more
impressive is that the Big 4 started from a much bigger base.
For example, Arthur Anderson had been adding the equivalent of
firms the size of Skadden Arps every year for the last several
years, at the same time that law firm growth is usually measured
in single digits. Law firms are also are not seen as innovators,
though a few are trying. Limited law firm growth and high
growth innovation by the professional services firms and some
dot.coms will bring about major changes in the practice of law in
the next 5 years.2
Some would argue that the recent auditing scandal that
brought down Arthur Andersen and has resulted in the Sa-
branes-Oxley bill3 mandating that accounting firms divest their
consulting services is proof of the correctness of lawyers sticking
with a narrow and traditional view on the practice of law. But
such critics are looking at the wrong side of the MDP firm, it is
not the auditing services that are a challenge to lawyers, but a
combination of law plus other unlicensed professional services
from organizations such as Accenture, IBM/PwC,
CAP/Gemini/Ernst & Young, McKinsey & Company et al that is
the real threat to law firms. These are so large that they will suf-
fer during downturns in the economy, but will also grow more
2 See Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., How a Sole Practitioner Uses the "Electronic Office" to
Maintain a Competitive Law Practice, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 141, 142 (1998) (affirming
technology is changing legal field); see also Joseph P. Tomain, The Code of One's Own, 15
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 153, 164 (2001) (explaining practice of law will
change with technology); Mark E. Wojcik, Lawyers Who Lie On-Line: How Should the Le-
gal Profession Respond to E-bay Ethics? 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 875,
891 (2000) (stating that Internet poses opportunity to change practice of law).
3 Sabranes-Oxley Bill of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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rapidly when the economy is good than will traditional law firms
that don't try innovative service models.
ETHICAL REGULATION AS BUSINESS MODEL PROTECTION
One of the primary factors limiting law firm innovation and
even growth are the Rules of Professional Conduct 4 and its
predecessor, the Code of Professional Responsibility.5 These rules
not only help define responsible conduct, but also control the
business model that attorneys can adapt. In some cases, attor-
neys are affirmatively prohibited from a particular business
model, such as the prohibition against forming partnerships with
non-attorneys. 6 In other cases, the rules greatly impede a busi-
ness model such as the prohibition against the use of sales
agents.7
As a result law firms offer only a very narrow range of profes-
sional services and business structures. Most firms from the
smallest to the largest are structured as partnerships. The larg-
4 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1983) (outlining ethical guidelines for attor-
neys). See generally Alex J. Hurder, Nonlavwyer Legal Assistance and Access to Justice,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241, 2274 (1999) (asserting that innovative approaches are not en-
couraged in ABA unauthorized practice of law rules). But see Cynthia Grant Bowman &
Elizabeth Mertz, Attorneys As Gatekeepers To The Court: The Potential Liability Of At-
torneys Bringing Suits Based On Recovered Memories Of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 27
HOFSTRA L. REV. 223, 246 (1998) (noting that attorney's use of innovative theories is pol-
icy considered by Model Rules).
5 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1980) (replacing Canons of Professional
Ethics in 1969). See generally David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study, 58 U.
CIN. L. REV. 199, 201 (1989) (noting that Model Code of Professional Responsibility was
adopted in 1969); Philip K Lyon & Bruce H. Phillips, Professional Responsibility in the
Federal Courts: Consistency is Cloaked in Confusion, 50 ARK L. REV. 59, 62 (1997) (ex-
plaining that ABA adopted Model Code to replace Canons of Professional Ethics).
6 MODEL RULE OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1983) (prohibiting attorney from forming
partnership with non-attorney if partnership engaged in practice of law). See Michael W.
Loudenslager, Cover Me: The Effects of Attorney-Accountant Multidisciplinary Practice
on the Protections of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 33, 41 n.40 (2001)
(noting Rule 5.4 prohibits attorney from forming partnership with non-attorney for pur-
pose of dispensing legal services); see also Stuart S. Prince, Comment, The Bar Strikes
Back: The ABA"s Misguided Quash of the MDP Rebellion, 50 AM. U.L. REV. 245, 247-248
(2000) (noting Rule 5.4 states non-lawyer and lawyer may not form partnerships to pro-
vide legal advice).
7 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 7.2 cmt. (1983) (prohibiting attorney from
paying another person to channel professional work). See generally Edward L. Birk, Pro-
tecting Truthful Advertising By Attorney-CPAs -Ibanez v. Florida Department of Busi-
ness & Professional Regulation, Board ofAccountancy, 114 S Ct. 2084 (1994), 23 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 77, 97 (1995) (claiming that while generalized attorney advertising is allowed,
targeted mail solicitations immediately following personal injuries are not); Mark D.
Flanagan, Lateral Moves and the Quest For Clients: Tort Liability of DepartingAttorneys
for Taking Firm Clients, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1809, 1819 (1987) (expounding that attorneys
have traditionally been barred from actively soliciting clients).
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est group of personnel is attorneys and their assistants; parale-
gals and secretaries. Marketing, technology and finance depart-
ments are traditionally small relative to the size of the firm and
have limited impact on the creation of new services.
The Internet, however, can give a small number of individuals
worldwide reach and the potential for great impact and large
revenues. Outside the legal profession, the result has been an
explosion of new businesses and business models. While many of
these early Internet business models have turned out to be con-
ceptually flawed, others have grown into multi-billion dollar
businesses in only a few years, e.g. Yahoo, AOL, now AOL Time-
Warner, PayPal and Ebay. Many traditional companies, such as
Dell and Schwab, have also moved much of their business on-
line.
At the same time no significant changes have occurred in the
traditional legal firms business models. The legal profession has
left the field wide open to other businesses such as the Big 4 and
a variety of other management consultancies and dot com com-
panies. We are seeing some law related businesses created by at-
torneys who have left their firms, but within firms most new ser-
vices are primarily to attract clients to the firms traditional
services.
HOW THE RULES ARE PREVENTING LEGAL SERVICES INNOVATION
The major rules that restrict the creation of innovative legal
services by law firms are:
(1) State licensing8
(2) Zealous representation 9
8 See e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6126 (Lexis 2002); N.Y. JUD. LAw §478 (Lexis
2002); see also Alafair S. R. Burke, Reconciling Professional Ethics & Prosecutorial
Power: The No-Contact Rule Debate, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1635, 1674 (1994) (explaining state
licensing boards regulate conduct of lawyers); Norman S. Johnson & Ross A. Albert, "Djh
Vu All Over Again:" The Securities and Exchange Commission Once More Attempts to
Regulate the Accounting Profession Through Rule 102(e) of Its Rules of Practice, 1999
UTAH L. REV. 553, 597 (1999) (noting attorneys are regulated through enforcement of
rules of state licensing boards); Lieutenant Colonel Norman K. Thompson, USAF & Cap-
tain Joshua E. Kastenberg, USAF, The Attorney-Clent Privilege: Practical Military Ap-
plications of a Professional Core Value, 49 A.F. L. REV. 1, 12 (2000) (stating that attor-
neys are bound by adopted rules only upon adoption by state licensing boards).
9 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2001) (requiring lawyers to be
zealous advocate on behalf of client); see also Roberta K. Flowers, An Unholy Alliance:
The Ex Parte Relationshp between the Judge and the Prosecutor, 79 NEB. L. REV. 251,
261 n.73 (2000) (noting danger posed by restricting zealous advocacy by attorneys); Ross
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(3) Fee splitting prohibition'O
(4) Traditional fee structures 1
(5) Subjective statements in advertising12
State licensing is by far the greatest impediment to law firms de-
veloping economically viable new services, so we will examine it
in some detail.
Lawyers have a monopoly within each state for traditional le-
gal services. 13 The laws and ethical restrictions protecting the
lawyers monopoly, protect them not only from other professions,
but also from lawyers in other states. The legal regulatory
scheme provides a variety of examples of restricting inter-lawyer
competition. 14 The intent is to prevent "unseemly" competition
Galin, Note, Above the Law: The Prosecutor's Duty to Seek Justice and the Performance
of Substantial Assistance Agreements, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1260-61 (2000) (ex-
plaining that in being zealous advocate lawyer must put client's interest above all else).
10 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2001) (prohibiting fee-splitting with
non-lawyer subject to few exceptions); see also George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The
Ethics of Middle-Class Access to Legal Services and What We Can Learn from the Medi-
cal Profession's Shift to a Corporate Paradigm, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 782 (2001) (ex-
plaining that ethical code prohibits fee splitting between lawyers and non-lawyers); Deb-
orah L. Rhode, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice: Too Much Rhetoric, Too Little Reform,
11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 989, 1016-17 (1998) (noting that business ventures between
lawyers and non-lawyers conflicts with rule against fee splitting).
II See James D. Shomper & Gardner G. Courson, Alternative Fees for Litigation: Im-
proved Control and Higher Value, 18 AM. CORP. COUNS. ASS'N 20, 34 (2000) (noting that
ethical rules may act as constraints on alternative fee arrangements); The SEC Speaks in
1998 Investment Management, 1039 PRAC. L. INST./CORP. 7 (1998) (acknowledging tradi-
tional fee structures as compared to new developments); Joseph A. Grundfest and Michael
A. Perino, The Pentium Papers: A Case Study of Collective Institutional Investor Activ-
ism in Litigation, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 602 n.242 (1996) (noting willingness of firms to
use non-traditional fee structures).
12 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1258
(1991) (announcing that "the Supreme Court invalidated the bar's endeavors to control
competition among lawyers through minimum fee schedules"); see also Robert D. Tollison,
Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 343 (1988) (stating that attorneys may
restrict competition amongst themselves through code of ethics).
13 See Steve French, When Public Policies Collide... Legal "Self-Help" Sot'ware and
the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 93, 99 (2001)
(stating that "[in many states, the unauthorized practice of law is also a crime and prose-
cution can result."); Grace M. Giesel, Corporations PracticingLaw Through Lawyers: Why
the Unauthorized Practice of Law Doctrine Should Not Apply, 65 MO. L. REV. 151, 165
(2000) (noting many state statutes criminalize unauthorized practice of law); 7 AM. JUR.
2D Attorneys at Law § 135 (2000)(explaining that "[v]arious legal methods have been em-
ployed in different jurisdictions to suppress the unauthorized practice of law, including
injunctions, punishment for contempt of court, a criminal prosecution, a judgment of
ouster in a quo warranto proceeding. .. "). See generally7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys atLaw§
14 (2000)(discussing constitutionality of admission requirements for state bars).
14 See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793 (1975) (holding that adher-
ence to minimum fee schedule set by state bar association was within reach of Sherman
Act); see also Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 591 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (summarizing
Goldfarb holding: "The State Bar. .. has voluntarily joined in what is essentially private
anticompetitive activity, and in that posture cannot claim it is beyond the reach of the
Sherman Act."). See generallyN.Y. GEN. BUS. LAw §340 (Lexis 2002).
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between attorneys (i.e. maintain the status quo) rather than pro-
tecting the client by making sure that the attorney is qualified to
practice the licensing state's law. For example, being licensed
without taking the bar exam is a classic example of how state li-
censing is not exclusively focused on protecting clients from law-
yers not trained in that state's law. Under this exception most
states allow the admittance of lawyers on motion15 after a certain
number of years of practice, frequently 5-7 years, an attorney can
be admitted to practice in another state without being examined
for their knowledge of the state's substantive law. Curiously, the
state may require the applying lawyer to pass the national
MPRE exam, not an exam that focuses on the admitting state's
particular ethical differences. 16 In New York where the older
Code of Professional Responsibility applies, there is no require-
ment that a lawyer admitted on motion be tested for New York
specific ethics rules, even if the lawyer is from a state like Con-
necticut, where the Rules of Professional Conduct apply.' 7 As a
result the rules tend to prevent the movement of younger, "hun-
gry" attorneys, while allowing for the limited movement that oc-
curs after an attorney is established.
Law students arguing appeals is another example. The rules
also allow unlicensed individuals to "take" cases from NY li-
censed attorneys, provided they can't make any money. 18 For ex-
ample Second Circuit Local Rule 46(e) allows a law student to
appear for an indigent person, if supervised by an attorney ad-
15 See e.g., CAL. ST. MISC. R. 983 (allowing out of state attorneys to appear pro hac
vice); N.Y. CT. R. 520.11 (outlining admission pro hac vice).
16 See e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6062 (Lexis 2002) (requiring applicant pass any
state's professional responsibility exam).
17 See John M. A. DiPippa, Lawyers, Clients, and Money, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L.J. 95, 112 n.116 (1995) (stating: "New York bases its ethical requirements on the ABA's
Model Code of Professional Responsibility."); Nicholas Targ, Attorney Client Confidential-
ity in the Criminal Environmental Law Context: Blowing the Wustle on the Toxic Client,
14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 227, 247 (1996) (stating Connecticut adopted Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct). See generally Thomas, supra, note 14, at 256 n.89 (citing then Chief
Justice of Nebraska Supreme Court, Norman Krivosha, that "[a] state's refusal to accept
recent MBE scores, given the uniformity of the test, is made even more troublesome when
such a state will nevertheless admit on motion an attorney of sufficient practice experi-
ence from another state, without regard to whether that other state's laws are similar or
not.").
18 See Frances M. Nicastro, Southern Christian: A Call for Extra-Constitutional
Remedies, Legal Clinical Education, and Social Justice, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'y 333, 355 (2001) (comparing law student's effectiveness as counsel to that of
practicing attorney's); Steven Zeidman, Sacrificial Lambs or the Chosen Few?" The Impact
of Student Defenders on the Rights of the Accused, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 853, 882-90 (1996)
(examining effect of student counsel).
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mitted to the Second Circuit bar.19 Contrast this with Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 46, which prohibits inexperienced
attorneys who presumably have paying clients from even becom-
ing a member of the Federal appellate bar.20
One of the clearest recent examples of state licensing being
used to prevent competition and the legislative reaction to this
monopolistic practice is Birbrower, Montaibano, Condon &
Frank, PC. v. The Superior Court of Santa Clara County2 In
this case Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, a New York
law firm, was retained to handle a software dispute for Esq.
Business Services (EBS), a company whose headquarters were in
California.
EBS, for whatever reason, decided that they did not want to
pay for Birbrower, Montalbano's services and claimed that noth-
ing was due, because Birbrower, Montalbano attorneys were not
licensed in California. The California Supreme Court agreed that
nothing was due for Birbrower Montalbano's work in California,
but did allow a quantum meruit argument for work done when
the attorneys were physically in New York State.22 This case
epitomizes the inherent contradictions in trying to apply geo-
19 Mark Pruner, The Internet and the Practice ofLaw, 19 PACE L. REV. 69, 81 (1998)
(stating "Second Circuit Local Rule 46(e) provides that a law student can appear for an
indigent person if supervised by an attorney admitted to the Second Circuit bar."); id. at
81 (citing "2nd Cir. R. 46(e)").
20 See Fed. R. App. P. 46; see also S.C.L.C. v. Supreme Court, 61 F. Supp. 2d 499, 506
(1999) aiFd 252 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2001) (ruling law restricting law student participation
in representation was not unconstitutional); Pruner, supra, note 17, at 81 (highlighting
under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP), rule 46, any attorney admitted to
practice in any state can be admitted to any federal appellate court).
21 949 P.2d 1, 13 (Cal. 1998) (Kinnard, J., dissenting) (arguing New York law firm vio-
lated CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §6125 by practicing law in California). See John J.
D'Attomo, The $1 Million Message: Lawyers Risk Fees and More When Representing Out-
of-State Clients, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 447, 447 (1999) (citing Birbrowercourt and sug-
gesting court held practice of law in California unauthorized because law firm repre-
sented client in California-based contract dispute); see also Kellie M. Smith, Exception for
Binding Arbitration Created for Out-of-State Counsel, 30 McGEORGE L. REV. 405, 406(1999) (explaining California legislature adopted Chapter 915 to allow out-of-state attor-
neys to utilize pro hoc vice procedure to represent clients in California arbitrations after
Birbrower decision).
22 Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 13 (stating law firm's statutory violation precluded recovery
of fees attributable to practice of law in California but not recovery for services performed
outside California). See Jacob J. Herstek, The Maryland Survey: 1998-1999: Recent De-
cisions, 59 MD. L. REV. 1171, 1185 (2000) (stating Birbrower allowed for fee recovery for
legal work performed in New York even though work was performed for California client);
see also Mark Pruner, supra note 20, at 82 (stating court held Birbrower and Montalbano
could collect fees for work done outside California but not for work performed within Cali-
fornia borders and also suggesting this policy is obsolete with improving technology, such
as Internet and video-conferencing).
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graphical restrictions from the 19th century when the primary
form of transportation was horse and buggy, to an age of tele-
phones, faxes, enail, extranets, FedEx and 777s.
The most curious aspect in the Birbrower Montalbano case is
the majority's holding that that Birbrower, Montalbano, could re-
cover for the value of the work done outside of California bor-
ders. 23 It did not matter whether the work Birbrower Montalbano
did involved California law, it only mattered where they were
physically located when they were doing the work. As the dissent
pointed out such distinctions make little sense in a world where
the Internet has made geography irrelevant. 24
The reasoning in this case if widely enforced would be a major
problem for modern law firms who have attorneys meeting cli-
ents across the U.S. Today, with the use of technology, lawyers
can practice lots of California law, even appearing in the state
through video conferencing, without every being physically pre-
sent in California.
The California legislature did not like the Birbrower decision
and quickly passed legislation authorizing outside firms to come
to California to represent companies in California mediation
matters. 25 Such legislative reversals of anti-competitive practices
are common. For example the Texas legislature reversed Judge
Barefoot Sander's decision holding that Parsons Technology's
personal lawyer software constituted the unauthorized practice
23 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
24 See Pruner, supra note 20, at 82 (arguing distinctions made by court regarding
physical presence in state are irrelevant in face of Internet communication); see also
Diane Leigh Babb, Take Caution When Representing Clients Across State Lines: The
Services Provided May Constitute the Unauthorized Practice ofLaw, 50 ALA. L. REV. 535,
540 (1999) (noting Birbrower court recognized need to discourage unreasonable geo-
graphic restrictions on practice of law in mobile and modern society). See generally Jack
Balderson, Jr., Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, PC. v. Superior Court: A De-
fensible Outcome, But a Striking Example of the Need to Reform Unauthorized Practice
of Law Provisions, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 871, 890 (1999) (arguing Birbrower decision ex-
poses need for state legislatures to amend unauthorized practice of law statutes to com-
port with interstate nature of modern legal practice).
25 See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1282.4 (b) (Deering 2001) (stating attorney admitted to
bar of another state may represent parties in arbitration proceeding in California); see
also John P. Cleary, Protecting the Public, Not Anyone's Turf The Unlicensed Practice of
Law in Securities Arbitration, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 543, 548 (1999) (stating California legisla-
ture amended Code of Civil Procedure to require non-admitted lawyers to meet certain
criteria before representing clients in private arbitrations in California); Ann L.
MacNaughton & Gary A. Munneke, Practicing Law Across Geographic & Professional
Borders: What Does the Future Hold, 47 LOY. L. REV. 665, 684 (2001) (noting California
legislature enacted law allowing pro hac vice admission in arbitration cases).
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of law. 26
Internet enabled legal services are even more difficult for the
traditional bar regulations than the issues in Birbrower. On the
Internet, location is irrelevant, every public website is accessible
from every computer hooked up to the Internet. To put up a legal
services website requires only one copy of a program or website to
make it available to the millions of users on the World Wide Web.
As a result companies engaged in e-commerce can easily grow to
substantial size very quickly (though being profitable is harder.)
Lawyers have seen the potential of this technology, but have
come up against several barriers the greatest of which is the eco-
nomic impact of state licensing.
As an example, imagine that the law firm of Roe & Doe is the
leading firm in the nation in preparing UCC filings. They are
hired in large deals to do UCC filings in all 50 states. They have
developed an internal system to handle their client's UCC filings.
The Roe & Doe internal system has quality assurance features
that notify them when their might be a problem with a particular
filing and links them to the appropriate case in their database
and the appropriate parts of their UCC filing manual. They now
want to put up a web-based front end on their system to allow
the banks and even members of the public to fill out the forms
and do the filings automatically. They even have a name for their
new service "UCC-Esquire".
UCC- Esquire would be a "smart" web-based system that ana-
lyzes the information input and asks the user a series of ques-
tions. Based on the user's input the system would point out legal
risks to the user, even citing cases and statutes where appropri-
ate. The software would also recommend to the user the best al-
ternatives to the legal risks discovered by the UCC-Esquire sys-
tem, just as it has done internally for the Roe & Doe attorneys.
26 See Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v. Parsons Technology, Inc., 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 813, at *21 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999) (holding Parsons Technology's
Quicken Family Lawyer software violated Texas unauthorized practice of law statute)
vacated by 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 14234 (5th Cir. Tex. 1999); see also Tex. Gov't Code
Ann. §81.101 (Lexis 2002). See generally Julee C. Fischer, Policing the Self-Help Legal
Market: Consumer Protection or Protection of the Legal Cartel? 34 IND. L. REV. 121, 132
(2000) (stating Texas legislature enacted emergency amendment to unauthorized law
practice statute to exclude computer software programs from definition of practice of law);
Steve French, When Public Policies Collide ... Legal "Self Help" Software and the Unau-
thorized Practice of Law, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 93, 113 (2001) (stating
Texas legislature expressed dissatisfaction with Parsons decision by enacting emergency
amendment to unauthorized practice of law statute).
2002)
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Roe, the traditional lawyer, has read Catherine Lanctot's arti-
cle Attorney-Client Relationshi'ps in Cyberspace: The Peril and
the Promise,27 and is concerned that since the system gives spe-
cific recommendations on specific fact situations, it is likely to be
construed as the practice of law in many states. Roe thinks the
firm will need to hire or affiliate with an attorney licensed in
each of 50 states. Doe, the advocate of innovation, says this will
be a huge additional burden to the development of the service
and they have been doing UCC filings for 20 years and no one
has ever accused them of the unauthorized practice of law before.
Doe argues that the burden includes not only the attorneys sala-
ries or retainers, but also the time and cost of finding and
managing 50 cyber-literate attorneys.
Roe suggest that they simply strip out the "legal" component.
But Doe says that is the firm's competitive edge. Roe knows that
several other software companies offer UCC filing packages (see
for example the Texas Secretary of State's list at
http://www.sos.state.tx.us/ucc/edilinks.shtml) and without their
"smart" features they are in a commodity filing business and will
lose to big corporate America. Roe suggests that they test market
the UCC-Esquire system only in their home state and worry
about expansion later. Doe points out that if they do this, none of
their large clients will want this service, because the reason they
hire Roe & Doe is because they provide a one-stop shop, national
solution.
Roe decides the UCC-Esquire has so much potential to capture
part of the 9 million UCC filings made annually, that he agrees
with Doe. They decide to go ahead with development and worry
about hiring the attorneys in the other states later. Roe, being
the lawyer's lawyer when it comes to UCC filings, is extremely
concerned that their system may not be smart enough. While it
contains their combined years of legal and technological experi-
ence, they are always coming across unusual situations that are
just too rare to program into the system. Doe says they should do
27 Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and
the Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147 (1999). See generally Katy Ellen Deady, Cyberadvice: The
Ethical Implications of Giving Professional Advice Over the Interne 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 891, 900-01 (2001) (quoting Professor Lanctot's discussion regarding lawyers' use
of disclaimers of liability on Internet); Jett Hanna, MoonhghtingLaw Professors: Identify-
ing and Minimizing the Professional Liability Risk, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 421, 425-26 (2001)
(discussing Lanctot's seminal article on law practice on Internet).
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what the software manufacturer's do and disclaim all liability.
Roe says that attorneys are not allowed to limit their liability
under Rule 1.8(h).
Rule 1.8. Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions
(h) A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively lim-
iting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless
permitted by law and the client is independently represented
in making the agreement, or settle a claim for such liability
with an unrepresented client or former client without first
advising that person in writing that independent representa-
tion is appropriate in connection therewith.28
Doe says fine, then if they can't limit our liability, they'll will
simply limit the scope of their representation to only those situa-
tions that UCC-Esquire is programmed to handle. The attorneys
take heart, because Rule 1.2(c) provides
Rule 1.2. Scope of Representation
(c) A lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if
the client consents after consultation. 29
They will give each user, the option of consultation, before
signing up. They see that the comment to Rule 1.2 offers fur-
ther assurance:
SERVICES LIMITED IN OBJECTIVES OR MEANS. The objectives
or scope of services provided by a lawyer may be limited by
agreement with the client or by the terms under which the
lawyer's services are made available to the client. For exam-
ple, a retainer may be for a specifically defined purpose. Rep-
resentation provided through a legal aid agency may be sub-
28 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.8 (h) (1983). See Robert P. Reffner,
Prepping the Elephant, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 449, 453 (2001) (noting Model Rule 1.8
governs conflicts of interest between lawyers and clients); see also Fred C. Zacharias,
Limits on Client Autonomy in Legal Ethics Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 199, 215 (2001)
(stating Model Rule 1.8 (h) involves settlements of legal claims against attorneys).
29 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.2 (c) (1983). See Susan Randall,
Managed Litigation and the Professional Obhgations of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 51
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 17 (2001) (stating Rule 1.2 (c) enables lawyer to limit objectives and
scope of legal representation with consent of client); see also Zacharias, supra note 26, at
222 (stating Rule 1.2 (c) permits lawyers and clients to negotiate representation with lm-
ited objectives).
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ject to limitations on the types of cases the agency handles.
When a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent
an insured, the representation may be limited to matters re-
lated to the insurance coverage. The terms upon which rep-
resentation is undertaken may exclude specific objectives or
means that the lawyer regards as repugnant or imprudent. 30
Until they get to the next paragraph and see the prohibition
against a limited representation that would violate Rule 1.1.
An agreement concerning the scope of representation must
accord with the Rules of Professional Conduct and other law.
Thus, the client may not be asked to agree to representation
so limited in scope as to violate Rule 1.1, or to surrender the
right to terminate the lawyer's services or the right to settle
litigation that the lawyer might wish to continue.31
Roe points out that Rule 1.1 requires that an attorney shall
provide competent representation to a client, which Doe says is
exactly what their system does. Roe read the comment to Rule
1.1, which says:
THOROUGHNESS AND PREPARATION. Competent handling of a
particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the
factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of meth-
ods and procedures meeting the standards of competent
practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation. The re-
quired attention and preparation are determined in part by
what is at stake; major litigation and complex transactions
ordinarily require more elaborate treatment than matters of
lesser consequence. 32
30 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.2 cmt. (1983). See Ann M. Scarlett,
Representing Government Offlicials in Both Their Individual and Official Capacities in
Section 1983 Actions After Johnson v. Board of County Commissioners, 45 KAN. L. REV.
1327, 1336 (1997) (stating comments to Rule 1.2 (c) indicate scope of legal services pro-
vided to client may be limited pursuant to agreement with client). But see Zacharias, su-
pra note 29, at 210 (arguing comments to Model Rule 1.2 (c) circumscribe client's right to
limit objectives of representation by incorporating lawyer's duty to provide client with
competent representation).
31 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. (1983). See Fred C. Zacharias, Lim-
its on Clent Autonomy in Legal Ethics Regulation, 81 B.U.L. REV. 199, 222 (2001) (argu-
ing that Rule 1.2 impedes client's contractual freedom); see also Lanctot, supra note 28, at
256 (discussing proposed amendments to Rule 1.2 that would allow appropriate represen-
tation limitations).
32 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1. cmt (1983). See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 6.2 cmt. (1983) (stating that lawyer has good cause to decline court-appointed
representation "if the lawyer could not handle the matter competently"). But see MODEL
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(2) (1980) (requiring only "preparation ade-
quate under the circumstances").
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Roe says the standard for representation is a human standard,
but Doe says so what, the natural tendency is to say no program
can measure up to a human in performance. Doe says this is not
always true. Programs do better than people where the number
of possibilities is large, but finite and readily determinable. In
such situations, humans tend to get bored, anticipate answers
and fail to explore all possibilities; Doe says her program always
checks all significant possibilities.
Roe agrees they have a great program that regularly catches
errors made by their paralegals, but the real problem is that the
person doing the input will input information improperly result-
ing in GIGO, Garbage In, Garbage Out. Doe says they can de-
sign in a mass customization feature so that not only is each
state's law taken into account, but also the peculiarities of all of
their major clients.
Doe then has a brainstorm and says some problems would ac-
tually be good for Roe & Doe. Whenever there is a problem the
web system will provide a direct connection to an attorney, so we
will be able to generate more billable hours. Roe says that more
billable time is good, but he is still concerned about the multi-
jurisdictional practice issue now that they will be on the web.
As Doe was thinking about the MJP problem she had another
brainstorm. They had a database of tens of thousands of filings
and the web would soon make it hundreds of thousands. Each of
these filings had dozens of non-public items associated with it.
He knew a partner at professional services firm that was using
advanced data mining techniques to predict all sorts of amazing
things. Doe's favorite was the convenience store that found they
could increase beer sales if they put them next to the diapers on
Fridays. It seemed that young fathers were stopping in on Friday
afternoon, their payday, to pick up diapers and would be more
likely to buy beer if it was next to the diapers. Doe was sure that
if they partnered with his friend's firm, that they could develop a
very lucrative business using data base mining.
When Roe heard about this he said absolutely not. Lawyers are
not allowed to split fees with non-lawyers and they can't form as-
sociations with non-lawyers he said citing Rule 5.4 (a) and (d).
Rule 5.4. Professional Independence of a Lawyer
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(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a non-
lawyer,... 33
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a pro-
fessional corporation or association authorized to practice
law for a profit, if:
(1) A non-lawyer owns any interest therein, except that a
fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold
the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time dur-
ing administration;
(2) A non-lawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof;
or
(3) A non-lawyer has the right to direct or control the pro-
fessional judgment of a lawyer. 34
Doe said that was no problem they could always create a subsidi-
ary, Roe & Doe Data Miners. Roe said he didn't want to be a data
miner, he was a lawyer and proud of it. Doe said, there was noth-
ing immoral about what she was proposing. She went on and said
that if she took this to idea to the Big 4, they could do the data
mining services, and make Roe & Doe a strategic "captive" firm.
She had seen this done in the District of Columbia, which had a
special version of Rule 5.4(b), which allowed MDPs:
(1) The partnership or organization has as its sole purpose
providing legal services to clients;
(2) All persons having such managerial authority or holding
a financial interest undertake to abide by these Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct;
(3) The lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial
authority or holding a financial interest undertake to be re-
sponsible for the non-lawyer participants to the same extent
as if non-lawyer participants were lawyers under Rule 5.1;
33 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1983).
34 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (2000).
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(4) The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing.35
Roe chuckled and said he didn't see how if the sole purpose of
the organization was to provide legal services, there was any
benefit to letting in non-legal professionals, unless you were look-
ing for a silent partner to provide financing. Doe agreed and said
it seemed to be primarily designed to let former government offi-
cials join law firms to do lobbying. Roe said even if we were based
in D.C. how would the other states react if Roe & Doe hired a
UCC filing manager and she started giving legal advice over the
web in their state. Doe said that was not a problem, because of
the commerce clause and comity. Roe asked if Doe spelled the
later comity or comedy.
Doe pointed out that the Big 4 already had lawyers in every
state and an agreement with a Big 4 firm could even solve their
MJP issue, since the Big 4 attorneys could join the "captive" Roe
& Doe on a part time basis. Roe said he was quite aware that
there were plenty of ways to structure these relations and stay
within the rules and thought that the issue of multi-disciplinary
practice was no big deal.
Doe agreed that from the rules viewpoint structuring a legal
MDP was easy, but she still thought that restrictions were a big
deal. She wanted to practice law and create new and valuable
professional services. If she had to do it in two different organiza-
tions, one or the other would get short-changed. Roe agreed with
that, he thought the way that most firms were creating subsidi-
aries was strange; no offices, little or no staff, limited advertising
and marketing, and the attorneys were supposed to do the MDP's
work in their "spare" time.
Doe countered that there were several firms that weren't tak-
ing this tact and were providing funds, staff, offices and even do-
ing some advertising. Doe said, that for these sophisticated firms,
she was concerned that affiliates were growing much, much
faster than the law firm. How would the attorneys working in the
MDP feel when their efforts were generating more than half the
firm's revenue. Roe said that was always possible, it certainly led
to the split up of Arthur Andersen & Andersen Consulting, (now
called Accenture).
Doe also pointed out that if you had separate organizations
3S D.C. RPC RULE 5.4(b).
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rather than a true MDP, that the firm wouldn't be a true one-
stop shop. Roe said one-stop shops were over-rated, doing a few
things well was better than doing everything mediocre. Doe said
Roe just didn't understand the power of the new technology to co-
ordinate worldwide operations. She pointed out the way that the
Big 4, airlines, media, financial and insurance companies were
all merging to get bigger, which allowed them to take advantage
of technology and spread their costs. Roe said there would always
be a place for the experienced, well-connected attorney, who
knew how to cut a deal. Doe agreed, but she said it wouldn't be a
very big place in the 21st Century.
Roe asked Doe, "Do you really thing we are going to make a lot
of money?" Doe said, sure, most lawyers never leverage their
capital investments. With our web-based system you pay for it
once and then sit back and let the money roll in, that is after a lot
of hard work, marketing, constant updating and improvements.
Even better once we start getting a good part of the filings, the
network effects will start kicking in. People will start accepting
our system as a standard. It will be written into contracts, other
people will design their systems to work with our system. It's a
great positive feedback loop. We will get rich and not have to
knock ourselves out billing people on an hourly basis.
Roe said, that's what has him worried. He pulled out ABA
Formal Ethics Opinion 93-379 entitled Billing for Professional
Fees, Disbursements and Other Expenses. 36 It says here you
can't bill two clients for the same time if you are researching the
same issue in each of their cases. Isn't that similar to what we
are doing in this on-line system. If one more person uses our sys-
tem, it essentially costs us nothing, yet we bill them for it.
Doe pointed out that Rule 1.5 doesn't say anything about that.
It just says:
Rule 1.5. Fees
(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be con-
36 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 379 (1993) (noting that
practice of billing multiple clients for same time or work product results in earning of un-
reasonable fee). See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.5 (2000) (providing factors to
be considered in determining reasonable lawyer's fees); see also Stephen W. Jones &
Melissa Beard Glover, The Attack on Traditional Billing Practices, 20 U.ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 293, 301 (1998) (discussing effect of ABA opinion).
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sidered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include
the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty
of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform
the legal service properly;
(2) The likelihood, if made known to the client, that the
acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other
employment by the lawyer;
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar
legal services;
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances;
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client;
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer
or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 37
Roe said, I know, but we used to do value billing. Our invoices
used to read "For Services Rendered" your bill is "X" dollars. If
the client didn't like it they called up. Now there is a strong feel-
ing that anything that is not billed by the tenth of an hour is a
subterfuge for fee gouging, when I think too often its the hourly
billing that results in unreasonable billing. Now that we can ac-
count for every minute, the client feels a lot less comfortable ar-
guing that the amount billed is not related to the value to him,
which he usually can't quantify exactly. Now you want to intro-
duce a system, where we use the same system over and over
again and charge each time, even if don't do a single hour of work
for that client.
Doe got exasperated and told Roe, that they are going to being
37 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (1983).
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doing the work better, faster and for less money than most firms.
It sure seems to her that UCC-Esquire fees match up with many
factors in Rule 1.5. I know, said Roe, but can't you just see some
practitioner including the fee issue in a complaint to an ethics
board or an unauthorized practice of law committee.
Doe told Roe, that they would win in the long run. If not before
the ethics committee, then before the legislature. Roe said he
wished he had Doe's optimism, because in a new business like
this, even a minor hint of impropriety will result in many of our
prestige clients abandoning us. With our big upfront costs, we are
not going to have a lot of funds left over to fight multiple court
fights and lobbying battles.
Doe say there was one thing that did worry her; the ethics
boards strict construction of Rule 7.1, which says:
Rule 7.1. Communications concerning a Lawyer's Services
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communica-
tion about the lawyer or the lawyer's services. A communica-
tion is false or misleading if it:
(1) Contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law,
or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered
as a whole not materially misleading;
(2) Is likely to create an unjustified expectation about re-
sults the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the
lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct or other law; or
(3) Compares the lawyer's services with other lawyer's ser-
vices, unless the comparison can be factually substanti-
ated.38
Roe agreed you have to be careful about 7.1, but said it is really
a guide to effective advertising. We are exposed to hundreds of
advertising messages every day. He said, their clients can spot
puffery in a second and they aren't taken in by it. In fact they ex-
pect puffery, so if they didn't do it, they would stand out. He said,
their clients are going to believe numbers more than hype. At the
38 MODEL RULES OF PROFVL CONDUCT R. 7.1 (1983).
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same time he agreed that with a strict interpretation, practically
any description is a violation, but at least we have plenty of com-
pany. Roe said he couldn't find a single law firm brochure or
website, where there wasn't some technical violation of this rule.
Doe said what really surprised her was the number of ways
that the Internet could be used that the Rules hadn't even con-
sidered. Take search engine rankings, there are lots of ways to
manipulate the UCC-Esquire site so that it comes up higher than
its competitors. In fact, Doe pointed out that they had better
start doing so, because less qualified firms were coming up
higher in search engine rankings than were Roe & Doe.
Doe also said they should work out linking arrangements with
a variety of other sites to feed us traffic. This not only got them
more traffic, but the more links they have to their site the higher
they would come up in search engines.
Doe pointed out that the model rules say practically nothing
about imagery. Could they put dollar signs in the photo montages
on their website? How about pictures of jubilant "clients"? Could
they put low cost clip art stock photos of "attorneys"? What if the
"attorney" is "in court", but has her backed turned to the camera,
so you can't tell if she is one of our attorneys? And could they link
to articles on the websites of reputable publication, if the articles
makes subjective statements about them that they couldn't make
themselves.
Roe asked Doe if she wanted to re-write the rules. Doe said she
wouldn't know where to start, but thought it wasn't going to be
an easy job. They both were glad the ABA was proposing to
loosen this Rule in their Ethics 2000 initiative.
LAWYERS ADVANTAGES
As the Roe & Doe debate indicates law is at a crossroads. En-
trepreneurial lawyers and non-lawyers are daily coming up with
new ideas to provide legal services in new ways, but lawyers and
traditional law firms are not going away. What you will see in
the next five years is greater change than you have seen in the
previous 50 years. Lawyers, and particularly certain specialties,
are under significant economic strain that will only get worse
over the next few years. At such times people are willing to try
new things.
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What may not be so clear from the Roe & Doe debate is that
lawyers do have significant advantages.
Lawyers are used to a changing and uncertain environment.
This is a significant advantage in today's economy. Lawyers have
a tradition of rapidly expanding into new practice areas, and re-
tooling their skills for new areas or when the market for their
present practice area contracts is common. What is unusually in
the changes today is that in addition to retooling their legal
skills, lawyers need to learn how to manage technology and also
how to create sophisticated marketing programs; and lawyers are
doing just that.
For example, the Law Marketing Association has grown rap-
idly in the last 10 years.39 Lawyers now receive regular training
in marketing and sales. Firms are now making strategic use of
advertising, even television ads. Law firms are taking booths at
trade shows and at least one firm has proposed creating an ac-
tual sales department rather than lumping sales in with market-
ing. Some firms are developing 5-year plans and setting up stra-
tegic planning committees that have real power.
One advantage rarely spoken of is that many of the people
writing the laws and nearly all the people interpreting the law
are themselves lawyers. As a result, the legislatures and the
courts are not the driving force behind changes in legal practice;
economics and public pressure drive the changes. Only when the
organized bar makes public attempts to prevent people, and to a
lesser extent companies, from getting better, faster, cheaper ser-
vices as in the Parsons Technology4O case do legislatures tend to
respond. 41
Lastly, people all other things being equal, will always prefer
39 See Prerequisites for Law Firms in the Market for a Marketing Pro, L. OFF. MGMT.
& ADMIN. REP., Aug. 1999, at 1. (noting that law firm marketing has grown dramatically
in past decade); see also Steven A. Meyerowitz, Marketing Ethics, N.Y. L.J., June 27,
2000, at 5 (noting Legal Marketing Association as important source of ethical advice);
New Resources for Law Firm Marketers, L. OFF. MGMT. & ADMIN. REP., Sept. 1999, at 5.
(discussing increased use of association for marketing advice).
40 Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v. Parsons Technology, Inc., 1999 WL
47235, at "11 (N.D.Tex. 1999), vacated 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that defen-
dant's computer software program violated Texas unauthorized practice of law statute)
41 See James W. Jones, Focusing the MDP Debate: Historical and Practical Perspec-
tives, 72 TEMPLE L. REV. 989, 992 (noting that American legal profession has been resis-
tant to changes in practice of law); see also Nicholas P. Terry, Bricks Plus Bytes: How
"Click-and-Brick" Will Define Legal Education Space, 46 VILL. L.REV. 95, 127-28 (2001)
(discussing impact of legal software on legal profession).
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meeting face to face with a legal advisor. In the 21st Century
lawyers must figure out how to efficiently deliver a wide variety
of services, while using minimal amounts of time billed at $400+
per hour. People are very slow to change their personal habits as
can be seen from the number of dot-bombs. They are not trusting
of an organization that they do not know.
CONCLUSION
Lawyers, however, must not be complacent, expecting that
people will always want legal services in the same way. If some-
one believes that their case or business issue will have an advan-
tage with a firm that combines both traditional legal skills with
technology, they will change firms. Also 21st technology can re-
sult in radically different services and such abrupt change cannot
be discounted. Companies like Yahoo and Ebay have created new
types of businesses. There are a dozens of business, both tradi-
tional companies and dot corns that have the potential to grow
very rapidly and impact the traditional law practice through the
use in Internet technology.
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